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This descriptive exercise presented in this paper suggests a certain spatial relationship between regions in Colombia 
that for years had the highest levels of territorial vulnerability, in terms of exposure to the internal armed conflict 
and structural violence, and the predominant views expressed both during the FARC-EP plebiscite and the second-
round presidential elections that took place in 2018. In a similar vein to the field of study of electoral geography, the 
reflections posited here suggest inquiring about a possible voting for peace trend in Colombia, which is particularly 
perceptible in the country’s territorial periphery, where support for Gustavo Petro and backing for the Peace Agreement 
signed with the FARC-EP guerrillas have found more supporters.
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Resumen
El trabajo que se presenta a continuación, en un ejercicio descriptivo, sugiere una cierta relación espacial entre los 
lugares de Colombia que durante años presentaron mayores niveles de vulnerabilidad territorial, en términos derivados 
del conflicto armado interno y violencia estructural, con respecto a la posición predominante tanto a tenor del plebiscito 
con las FARC-EP, como con las elecciones presidenciales de la segunda vuelta, acontecidas en 2018. Con una alta 
proximidad al campo de estudio que representa la geografía electoral, se proponen reflexiones que sugerirían indagar 
en un posible voting for peace en Colombia, especialmente perceptible en la periferia territorial del país, en donde el 
apoyo a Gustavo Petro y el respaldo al Acuerdo de Paz suscrito con la guerrilla de las FARC-EP encuentra mayores 
adeptos.
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Introduction
The main purpose of this article is to comment and reflect upon the relationship between violence, 
the post-conflict and electoral trends in Colombia, on the basis of certain patterns suggested by voter 
distribution maps in recent events: signing of the Peace Agreement, plebiscite vote on the agreement, and 
presidential elections.
The 2015 map of the areas with highest territorial vulnerability indicators in terms of direct 
violence derived from the armed conflict per se, and also socioeconomic structural violence (Galtung, 
1969), displays a high level of correlation with the political and electoral behavior of these territories, both 
on October 2, 2016, the date of the plebiscite that asked the Colombian civil population to vote for or 
against the Peace Agreement signed one week earlier with the FARC-EP guerrilla, and with the tendency 
to vote in favor of presidential candidate Gustavo Petro. To put it in simpler terms: there seems to be a 
high level of correlation between direct violence, structural violence, support for the Peace Agreement and 
support for the progressive presidential candidate in the territories. 
The aim of this article is to reflect on the possible existence of a vote for peace in Colombia, 
framing the topic with the specialized literature on the relationship between political behavior and electoral 
geography in general, and with regard to the Colombian case in particular.
The structure of this paper is particularly simple. First, it presents a review of the most relevant 
literature and the predominant theoretical approaches to the subject. Then it analyzes the spatial trends 
of the political behavior through three maps: the 2015 territorial vulnerability index map, the electoral 
behavior map of the October 2, 2016 plebiscite, and finally, the map for the second-round vote of the 
2018 presidential elections. The paper will finalize with some conclusions aimed at opening possible 
lines of research and subsequent work to that regard which could determine whether it is really possible 
to understand an electoral motivation in Colombia whose fundamental cleavage is support for a Peace 
Agreement and a structural transformation of the dynamics that for decades have supported violence.
State of the Art
While this work centers on strictly descriptive aspects, the initial intention, in the absence of empirical 
evidence and more solid contributions to that regard, points to thinking about the possible correspondence 
between the experience of violence, the desire for peace, and the rupture with the particular way of 
understanding the resolution to this question, which has been posed by Uribismo since the beginning of 
the last decade. Contributions from Bussi (1998) to Sonnleitner (2013) give a good account of how the sum 
of cartographic methodologies and historical trends in electoral analysis provide particular readings of 
how the context and the place affect the particular way in which the citizenry internalizes, problematizes 
and politicizes the aspects that define and modulate their needs as citizens and their responses to public 
policy (Agnew, 1987; Lois, 2010).
Electoral geography provides multiple options for assessing the relationship between violence, 
peace and electoral support, ranging from viewing the constituencies themselves to addressing spatial 
variations in the vote distribution, in parallel to the violence derived from the conflict, the influence 
of environmental factors on electoral behavior, or the scope and meaning of electoral distribution and 
elements of local power that configure it (Johnston et al., 1987). The above does not exclude possible 
sociological analysis of the vote, in line with the proposal made by Goguel (1951) decades ago under a 
mosaic of qualitative or quantitative techniques that address the social, cultural and economic aspects of 
the vote (Balderas, 2012).
While studies about democracy have predominated in Latin America’s electoral geography 
(Medús, 1997), over the last twenty years there has been a proliferation of literature that goes beyond the 
traditional positive approaches and quantitative looks at the object of the study, superimposing holistic 
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perspectives (Sonnleitner, 2005) with territorial 
perspectives and characterizations (Sonnleitner, 
2007, 2013; Monzón, 2009; Pinto, 2016; Bosque 
and Buzai, 2017), that surpass the positivism that 
has dominated the discipline since the middle 
of the 20th century (Lazarsfeld and Berelson; 
1962; Lazarsfeld and Elihuz, 1955) and posit 
new territorial outlooks (Cox, 1969), especially in 
relation to spatial models such as those suggested, 
among many, by Flint and Taylor (2002).
Another perspective, if fitting, closer to 
the Colombia reality might emphasize factors that 
may, for example, influence abstentionism, such 
as was posited by, among others, Benny Geys 
(2006), when he discusses the different models 
that explain electoral abstentionism, addressing 
the type of voters, their socioeconomic conditions 
and influence of the strategic vote. 
The aforementioned because in Colombia, 
for instance, the Peace Agreement plebiscite and 
presidential elections demonstrated abstentionism 
levels of 62% and 53%, respectively, which beckon 
to be understood in a particular key, in spatial terms 
and without avoiding the particular historical, 
social, cultural and symbolic aspects that take 
place in each region (Horbath, 2004).
Studies of electoral geography in Colombia 
have not necessarily been a prolific object of study. 
In any event, it is worth mentioning in the first 
place the Atlas of Elections in Colombia, which 
between 1974 and 2002 provided an electoral 
analysis of how the vote spread throughout the 
various presidential elections, including some of the 
factors that condition electoral behavior, as noted 
by Losada et al. (2004). Losada (1978) also stated 
that Colombia might have been the precursor of 
electoral geography studies upon an analysis of the 
relationship between geographical scales and types 
of election. Moreover, Dávila’s (1990) contributions 
focused on the presidential vote, and in particular, 
on the relation between municipal order and the 
two-party system.
One perspective that has prevailed in 
recent years has to do with studies of department, 
municipality and even district cases. Thus Jácome 
(2012), for example, analyzes the pattern of electoral 
behavior in municipal elections in Bogotá, and 
concretely, in localities such as Teusaquillo or La 
Candelaria, to thereby understand the relation 
between the socioeconomic level and voting pattern. 
Mora (2010), extended his work to understand 
the relation between electoral patterns in various 
municipalities of Cundinamarca and some of the 
most relevant aspects of the political culture. This 
has been applied by Rodriguez (2005), among others, 
in municipal and departmental elections in Bolívar.
Perhaps with regard to the particular 
relation between violence and vote, one of the 
most outstanding and noteworthy works is one 
by Misión de Observación Electoral - MOE - (the 
Electoral Observation Mission), which completed 
an interesting project in 2016 showcasing an 
electoral risk map that presented the results of 
the plebiscite for the Peace Agreement with the 
FARC-EP, with electoral risk maps due to the 
territorial entrenchment and presence not only 
of the guerrillas, but also of criminal bands that 
evolved from the paramilitaries, for a period that 
covered 1996 to 2011. 
Another similarly noteworthy work is 
that by González (2017), an original depiction of 
an analysis regarding the arguments yielded by 
the proponents of the “no” vote. In the electoral 
geography analysis he includes a look at the 
argumentation and manipulation, with special 
emphasis on a review of social media networks. 
This has also been addressed by others such as 
Magallón (2016) and Restrepo and Ramírez (2016).
In any case, there is still a prolific and 
potential field of study that integrates electoral 
geography with the relationship between direct 
and structural violence pertaining to the conflict. 
On the latter there is an interesting bibliography 
in the works of Echandía (2006; 2010), Salas 
(2010; 2015) and Ríos (2016; 2018) that shows the 
close relationship between the spatial dynamics of 
guerrilla and paramilitary activism and structural 
violence, so that in integrating these perspectives 
with an electoral geography analysis might serve 
to understand voting patterns and political and 
electoral behavior in Colombia.
This is something that has been theorized 
by Horbath (20115), among others, when he posits 
how manipulating and buying votes is brought to 
the elections, feeding off the poverty and inequality; 
on the basis of traditional political strategies 
that enable maintaining the status quo in the 
political arena, and how a weak electoral system 
drives away the reality of social justice from the 
perception of the common voter. In fact, Gutiérrez 
(2014) has inquired how instruments such as the 
privatization of security, inequality and absence of 
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land ownership rights in Colombia have affected 
electoral behavior; while Hoskin and Pachón (2008) 
have centered on the direct influence of armed 
activism by paramilitary groups, drug traffickers 
and guerrillas. Finally, and in the context of events 
that have transpired in recent years, it is important 
to mention the contributions of authors like 
Gallego (2018), Liendo and Braithwaite (2018), and 
Weintraub et al. (2017).
Reviewing the vulnerability map in 
Colombia, 2012-2015
As stated earlier, while not all departments and 
regions in Colombia have been affected in the 
same measure, as several authors have recognized, 
including González (2012:2014), Rodríguez 
Cuadros (2015) and Bechara (2012), Colombia 
bears deep scars caused by the violence. In fact, 
Ríos (2017) noted how 82% of the municipalities 
with the most violence and 64% with the highest 
poverty had mobilized on behalf of the plebiscite in 
October 2016.
Based on that, and as expected, one of the 
pivotal elements of the Peace Agreement centered 
on places with the highest levels of vulnerability, 
which are known as PDET sites, indicating Planes 
de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (Development 
Plans with a Territorial Focus). It seems that from 
this perspective, priority must be given to the mu-
nicipalities as well as institutional and social capac-
ities, with the aim of formalizing, driving and con-
solidating their productive capacity, increased gov-
ernment presence, and future sustainability that 
must uphold a peace building process (Ríos, 2017).
All of this becomes indispensable because 
it mainly deals with peripheral, coca farming, 
border territories lacking institutionality, with very 
strong ties to direct violence. From a departmental 
and comparative perspective, this has perfectly 
mirrored the indicator of territorial vulnerability 
developed by the National Planning Department 
(2015), which as shown in many other studies 
(Salas, 2015; Ríos, 2017), shows a positive and 
significant correspondence between said territorial 
vulnerability and the concurrence of armed actors, 
especially FARC-EP and ELN.
After the first agreement signed 
between the Colombian government and FARC-EP 
guerrillas, combats between the guerrilla and the 
armed forces dropped significantly as of August 26, 
2012 in many municipalities around the country. 
In fact, according to the Peace and Reconciliation 
Foundation (2015, p. 5), the intensity of the 
confrontation decreased by up to 40% from 2013 
to 2014, not a negligible figure when compared to 
the over 800 unilateral actions undertaken by the 
FARC-EP just in 2012 (Ríos, 2017).
In 2014 a total of 1,349 former FARC-EP 
combatants demobilized in territories with deeply 
rooted guerrilla affiliations, including southern 
Tolima and northern Huila (Peace and Reconciliation 
Foundation, 2015, p. 22). Similarly, during the 
five truces that took place while negotiations were 
conducted in Havana, the FARC-EP fulfilled 98% 
of their agreement. Illegal actions occurred only 
in isolated regions, always in the most remote 
departments with the highest levels of territorial 
vulnerability. This is where the 242 municipalities 
are located, which in 2014 still claimed FARC-EP 
presence, while 99 of them had ELN presence, 60 
of them coinciding with the FARC-EP (Peace and 
Reconciliation Foundation, 2015, p. 7).
According to Figure 1, the departments of 
Antioquia and Bolívar, the Pacific coastal region, 
the southwestern corridor and some areas in the 
northeast are settings with an extremely high 
correlation between guerrilla violence and territorial 
vulnerability. Some of the departments with the 
highest levels of structural violence include Nariño, 
Putumayo, Caquetá, Cauca, Valle del Cauca and 
Vichada. Their reality has little to do with central 
departments like Cundinamarca, Santander, Meta 
and Caldas, among others (National Planning 
Department, 2015). 
Early last decade a central-peripheral 
fracture consolidated that would allow the 
government to justify the importance of solidifying 
their efforts in those scenarios in terms of 
investment, the productive framework, legal security 
and institutional strengthening. To this day, those 
needs are still unmet and have been unraveled by 
decades of armed violence. 
As recognized by Salas (2016b) and the 
Office of the Public Defender (2015), this situation 
crosses over to other settings, in many cases 
mostly forgotten regions like Córdoba, Bolívar and 
Chocó, which are afflicted by particular problems 
such as illegal mining (Massé and Le Billon, 2017), 
dispossession of lands, forced displacement and 
a concentration of rural people in conditions of 
extreme poverty (Rojas, 2016).
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Reviewing the electoral participation 
map for the Peace Agreement referendum 
signed with the FARC-EP
The government of Juan Manuel Santos submitted 
the agreement signed between his Executive Office 
and the FARC-EP guerrillas to a plebiscite. This 
process meant taking unnecessary risks with the 
president’s popularity, which at that time was below 
30%. Moreover, highly inflated surveys favored the 
agreement, alleging support of almost 70% which 
pointed to a favorable vote; and in addition to this, a 
lack of knowledge of what the Agreement entailed, 
plus the spectacle of the signing held one week 
before the plebiscite was conducted.
Because of all this, as well as a campaign 
strongly tainted by media manipulation and 
simplistic clichés that posited a fervent opposition 
to the Agreement, insisting that Colombia would 
become the next Venezuela or that the gender 
ideology contained in the Agreement would infringe 
on the traditional Colombian sense of family, the 
“no” to the Agreement with the FARC-EP ultimately 
prevailed by a tight margin of 53,000 votes. It is 
impossible to overlook the recourse of inadequate 
surveys, which clearly ended up overestimating 
the opinions in large cities as well in some in some 
smaller towns (Basset, 2018, p. 244). 
As observed in Figure 3, departments 
shaded in green represent those where the vote 
favorable to the Peace Agreement prevailed. It could 
be said that at least there is a possible correlation 
between border departments, which have peripheral 
characteristics and are more affected by direct and 
structural violence (Ríos, 2017) and a position of 
stronger commitment to closing the armed conflict 
with the FARC-EP guerrilla in a negotiated manner. 
Expressed in different terms, central 
enclaves without a guerrilla presence for a number 
of years and/or favored by the Democratic Security 
Policy and Plan Colombia would have demonstrated 
a stronger rejection to a negotiated solution in this 
instance, underscoring the hypothesis of being 
distant from the violence which is maintained by 
Rincón (2016) and Álvarez and Garzón (2018), 
among others. 
In any case, honing in on the analysis and 
beyond the fact that in departments like Caldas 
(57.09%), Cundinamarca (56.52%), Huila (60.77%), 
Meta (63.58%), Quindío (69.13%), Risaralda 
(55.69%), Santander (55.64%) and Tolima (59.71%) 
the Peace Agreement was roundly rejected, it is 
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Figure 1. Index of Territorial Vulnerability Map (2012) 
Source: National Planning Department.
Figure 2. Index of Vulnerability Map in the Post Conflict 
(2015) 
Source: Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (2015, 
p.61).
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obvious that in peripheral settings like Norte de 
Santander (63.92%) and Casanare (71.14%), with 
very high levels of disapproval for the Agreement, 
and similar to what happened in Central America, 
there was a direct influence of having been 
victimized by kidnappings, extortion and violence 
for decades by the guerrilla.
At any rate, it is important to be careful 
with methodologies and analyses that have to 
be developed in the field of political and electoral 
geography, among others, because at the same 
time, in places where the FARC-EP was a 
hegemonic actor for decades were where in general 
terms there was a greater mobilization in favor of 
the Agreement. This mobilization also prevailed 
in 21 of the 32 Colombian departments, very 
significantly in Chocó (79.76%), Vaupés (78.05%), 
Cauca (67.39%) Putumayo (65.50%) and Nariño 
(64.81%). Specifically, departments with the worst 
conditions in terms of multi-dimensional poverty, 
income inequality and unmet basic needs indicators 
(DANE, 2016). These are elements inherent to the 
structural violence which would also include a 
marked coca-growing footprint, as half of all coca 
crops grown in Colombia are concentrated in just 
three departments; Nariño (42.627Ha), Putumayo 
(25.162Ha) and Cauca (12.595Ha).
Thus, and according to Basset (2018), it 
would be fitting to accept the hypothesis of a sort 
of voting for peace in the territories most affected by 
the violence from the armed conflict, because those 
municipalities that reported the greatest FARC-
EP presence participated with 56% favoring the 
Agreement. In turn, areas with more ELN presence 
voted yes with 57% support. To a lesser degree this 
happened in municipalities with strongly entrenched 
criminal bands (51.1%), in contrast with the 65.9% 
support for the Agreement obtained in the other 
municipalities targeted by the Development Plans 
with a Territorial Focus, as well as in other enclaves 
where there were more displacements in 2016 that 
reported favorable support for the Agreement in 
excess of 55%. The relative weight of the rural/
urban divide, the popularity of Juan Manuel 
Santos and the manipulating influence of parties 
that sabotaged the peace process must at the very 
least be taken into consideration in all these cases 
(Bergquist, 2017).
Ultimately, and beyond any particular 
aspects which will certainly be addressed and 
satisfied in the future thanks to political and social 
research, the truth is that everything indicates 
the need to take into consideration a correlation 
between the territories that reported more FARC-
EP guerrilla actions, resulting from their historical 
entrenchment, and the opportunities and 
favorability for a framework to overcome armed 
violence and build peace. Thus, understanding the 
plebiscite as an enabler mechanism for the citizenry 
to express their position on the issues negotiated 
with the FARC-EP guerrillas, in conclusion it must 
be considered that those who lived closest to the 
dynamics of the direct violence, at least in recent 
years, are those who manifested a greater degree of 
favorability thereto.
Reviewing the political-electoral 
participation map in the 2018 presidential 
elections
Although Ivan Duque’s successful bid in the second 
round of presidential elections in 2018 resulted from 
the support and backing of the Andean corridor 
and the country’s central-southern region, giving 
him nearly ten million votes, it is not wise to ignore 
Figure 3. Results of the Peace Agreement plebiscite by 
departments, 2016. Green depicts in favor of the Peace 
Agreement with the FARC-EP. 
Source: National Civil Registry (s.p.). 
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the important support received by progressive 
candidate Gustavo Petro, who earned over eight 
million votes.
In some departments that border Venezuela 
such as La Guajira, Cesar, Norte de Santander 
and Arauca, Uribism certainly prevailed, using 
the current situation in Venezuela as a perfect 
instrument to stress the political sense and direction 
it offered Colombia at that time. Morphing Gustavo 
Petro into Nicolás Maduro and taking advantage 
of being on the border with Venezuela, Uribism 
played an easy match in that part of the country. 
So it used campaign slogans like “I don’t want to live 
like a Venezuelan” and launched the presidential 
campaign in a Venezuelan supermarket, much 
like Marta Lucía Ramírez did. It used the Andean 
neighbor to leverage its fear campaign, adding other 
elements that really shake up Colombia, such as 
Gustavo Petro’s past as a member of the M-19 
guerrilla, and fixated on the term “Castro-chavism”.
With more intensity after the second 
round, the majority of conservatives surrounded 
Iván Duque, including the Conservative Party, the 
Liberal Party, the U Party and Radical Change, 
plus the evangelical churches and the MIRA 
Party, as well as famous personalities the likes of 
Alejandro Ordóñez, Juan Carlos Pinzón and Viviane 
Morales, and business associations such as the 
National Coffee-Growers Association, Asobancaria 
and Servientrega, to name a few. Sensu contrario, 
Gustavo Petro received the support of Claudia 
López, his Vice-president was Sergio Fajardo in the 
first round; Antanas Mockus, senator, and other 
outstanding individuals such as Ingrid Betancourt, 
Clara López, Antonio Navarro and Iván Cepeda, all 
of whom agreed in pointing out that Petro was the 
only one that could guarantee the Peace Agreement 
with the FARC-EP. This was shared with important 
associations, including the Colombian Federation 
of Education Workers (FECODE), the National 
Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC), the 
Central Workers Union (CUT), and support from 
international academics like Thomas Piketty, Slavoj 
Žižek and John Maxwell.
Just as the plebiscite showed which re-
gions supported the Peace Agreement, a territorial 
dynamic for the vote was evident in elections for the 
National Congress held on March 11, as in previous 
presidential elections. Some considerations are pre-
sented below, paying special attention to the second 
round of presidential elections where the discourse 
and political position in favor of or against the Peace 
Agreement can be best observed. 
The political-territorial trend in central 
departments
Table 1 below was prepared with a strict 
classification determined by each department’s 
geographical location. Added to this are other 
aspects such as the territorial vulnerability index 
(TVI), which is understood as “insecurity found in 
communities, families or individuals as a result of 
the impact caused by some type of economic-social 
event” (Pizarro, 2001, p.11). To that end, TVI studies 
conducted by the National Planning Department 
were taken into consideration to learn about the 
possible connection between direct violence and 
structural violence based on six weighted variables: 
1) humanitarian assistance, 2) security, 3) justice, 
4) social development, 5) economic development, 
and 6) governance in terms of fiscal capacity 
(National Planning Department, 2015, p.8).
The second aspect addressed has to do 
with the human development index (HDI) which is 
calculated on the basis of variables such as per capita 
GDP, life expectancy and education (UNDP, 2011). 
In this manner, it would be easy to understand that 
Figure 4. Result of the presidential elections in the second 
round, 2018. 
Source: National Civil Registry (s.p.).
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there is an inversely proportional relation between 
inequality and human development. In other words, 
as a department or municipality displays greater 
inequality, its human development index will be 
lower (UNDP, 2011, P.57).
In examining the results, some notable 
changes are evident in the voting outcome, mainly 
in the second round, in favor of Iván Duque as 
related to the Peace Agreement plebiscite. For 
instance, departments located in the coffee belt, 
and in general, in the Andean region, displayed a 
marked favoritism for Iván Duque, five points on 
average above the vote against the Peace Agreement 
in 2016, 
Something remarkable, for example, in 
departments like Antioquia (72.53%), Caldas 
(65.67%), Quindío (62.76), Risaralda (61.57%) 
and a considerable area in north Tolima (65.89%). 
While in all these there is a close correlation 
between presidential preference and the position on 
negotiations with the FARC-EP, on the other hand 
it is worth mentioning that for the most part these 
are departments with a medium or low TVI impact, 
which minimizes things like structural violence. 
In that regard, the only exception would 
be the city of Bogotá, which went opposite to the 
department of Cundinamarca, despite the fact that 
both settings share a very low TVI and one of the 
highest HDI in the country. So while approval for 
the plebiscite in Bogotá was at 50.08% in favor, 
most of the municipalities in Cundinamarca voted 
against it and the Uribista trend, something that 
occurred similarly in Boyacá with regard to the even 
more progressive position of some of its major cities, 
like Villa de Leyva with 51.79% and the capital city, 
Tunja with 56.62%. 
The political-territorial trend in peripheral 
departments
Things were very different in the peripheral 
departments, which represent twenty-two of the 
thirty-two Colombian departments. There they 
showed clear favoritism for the Peace Agreement, 
and also for Gustavo Petro’s candidacy. In fact, eight 
of the departments took both of those positions. 
Except for Bogotá, the progressive candidate 
for “Colombia Humana” won the peripheral 
departments located in the southwestern region of 
Colombia, including Cauca (65%), Nariño (63.85%) 
and Putumayo (69.63%); as well as in the Pacific 
Table 1.
Central Departments. Classification between the territorial vulnerability index (TVI), human development index (HDI), 
percentage of votes in the 2016 plebiscite and percentage of votes in the 2018 second presidential round
Departments TVI Rating HDI Plebiscite 
vote
% Second presidential 
round vote
%
Antioquia Medium-low 0.849 NO 62 Iván Duque 72.53
Bogotá Low 0.904 YES 56.07 Gustavo Petro 53.35
Boyacá Medium-low 0.842 YES 50.08 Iván Duque 54.81
Caldas Medium 0.828 NO 57.09 Iván Duque 65.67
Cundinamarca Low 0.837 NO 56.52 Iván Duque 56.48
Huila Medium 0.807 NO 60.77 Iván Duque 64.71
Meta Medium 0.822 NO 63.58 Iván Duque 63.95
Quindío Medium-low 0.832 NO 60.13 Iván Duque 62.76
Risaralda Medium-low 0.839 NO 55.69 Iván Duque 61.57
Santander Medium-low 0.879 NO 55.64 Iván Duque 60.30
Tolima Medium-low 0.804 NO 59.71 Iván Duque 65.89
Source: Prepared by author based on data from the National Registry, National Planning Department and the United 
Nations.
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region departments like Chocó (58.82%) and 
Valle del Cauca (51.76%) and others like Vaupés 
(59.56%), and in the northwestern corner as was 
seen in Atlántico (54.96%) and Sucre (50.39%). 
One common vector, especially with regard to the 
southwestern region of Colombia, and perhaps 
reaching the entire Pacific coast, would be crucial 
impact of both direct violence (Salas, 2010; 2015; 
Ríos, 2016; 2017) and structural violence (DNP, 
2016; 2017), which translates, among other 
things, into an absence by the Government, 
multidimensional poverty, greater inequality in 
terms of income and/or concentration of land, 
repeated killings of social leaders, in addition to 
other important lacking in terms of unmet needs. 
There are other significant nuances at work 
here that should be more meticulously addressed. 
For instance, in departments like Arauca, Norte de 
Santander and Caquetá, despite a large presence 
of armed groups and high levels of coca crops (with 
the exception of Arauca), support for Duque shot up 
to fifteen percentage points on average if compared 
with the voting against the Peace Agreement with 
the FARC-EP. In this way, the condition of sharing 
a border with Venezuela (again), or the fact that in 
the conservative vote prevailed in Caquetá, if only 
for the differentiating factor of the capital city of 
Florencia, seem to invite reservation and a more 
meticulous analysis.
On the other hand, important differences 
should be noted between the northwestern border 
and the southeast, both between the regions 
themselves and the mobilization for the plebiscite 
and the presidential election. So while Amazonas 
(56.64%), Bolívar (60.23%), Córdoba (60.73%), La 
Guajira (61.14%) and Magdalena (60.53%) voted 
overwhelmingly in favor of the Peace Agreement, 
at the same time the Uribista candidate was 
victorious in the presidential elections, albeit with 
a smaller margin of support than in the Colombian 
Andean corridor. 
In turn, Antioquia emerged as the 
department with the strongest support for 
conservatism, despite being significantly impacted 
by the internal armed conflict, and where Iván 
Duque would not only prevail widely, but only 29 of 
its 125 municipalities voted for the Peace Agreement, 
with notable exceptions in municipalities such as 
Ituango, Segovia, Murindó, Chigorodó and San José 
de Apartadó. The dynamics in Chocó were also in 
the opposite direction, being one of the departments 
with the strongest support for the vote for peace 
hypothesis, and where support for Gustavo Petro 
and the Peace Agreement was especially relevant in 
municipalities such as Bojayá and Vigía el Fuerte.
Conclusions
As part of the brief description reported herein, it is 
important, as the basis of a geographical-electoral 
theory, to first address an eventual relation between 
the people’s political and electoral behavior, and the 
relation of the territory both with direct violence and 
with the desire of overcoming it. Therefore, and in the 
absence of deeper research, it is possible to accept 
the concurrence that in certain settings across the 
country there is a position supportive of the political 
and ideological options that result in a structural 
transformation of violence, and the assumption of 
a scenario of positive and transforming peace, as 
described by Johan Galtung, which are closer to 
supporting the Peace Agreement and Gustavo Petro 
than the line represented by Iván Duque.
Thus it becomes clear that the departments 
and municipalities with the highest index of 
territorial vulnerability were also, for the most 
part, the regions that said “yes to peace”. This 
fact leads to observe a close relationship between 
direct violence and structural violence, as in the 
case of departments such as Nariño, Putumayo, 
Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Chocó, and a large swath 
of Caquetá. In contrast, areas that benefitted from 
the Democratic Security Policy and Plan Colombia 
include departments such as Cundinamarca, Meta, 
the coffee belt and Antioquia.
Based on all of the above, only 13 of the 32 
Colombian departments actually voted against the 
Peace Agreement, which are primarily in the most 
central enclaves in the country, Similarly, regarding 
voter preference in the electoral contests, other 
than the paradoxical case of Bogotá, in settings 
like the Pacific coastal region there is less support 
for Duque, and then there is the influence (beyond 
the peace/violence duality and other issues that 
triggered electoral support) resulting from the 
predominantly conservative political culture that 
characterizes the country. That is, the threat of 
what is crudely called “gender ideology”, or the 
risk of “Castrochavisizing” Colombia, emulating 
the political and social processes of Cuba and 
Venezuela, which far from any reality, could lead to 
deactivating the electoral mobilization for reasons 
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strictly related to the armed conflict.
In conclusion, and while this paper does not 
shed any conclusive results or closed hypotheses, it 
still serves to identify possible lines of research that 
could optimize the geo-political explanation of how 
the armed conflict and its demise has articulated 
a type of political and electoral response in certain 
settings across Colombia. 
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